As an Australian ally, New Zealand is bringing less to the party than in decades past, and it seems that the Australians are now expecting less of us, writes Wayne Mapp.

Is New Zealand’s strategic position changing in a fundamental way that will become increasingly evident within a few short years?

New Zealand’s challenge, as always, is relevance. This question essentially is the extent to which New Zealand still counts with friends and allies. Or to put it another way, Is New Zealand essentially part of Australasia or should it be seen as the largest of the Pacific Island nations.

Determining New Zealand’s path will largely determine our strategic situation. Being seen as primarily an Australasian nation inevitably networks New Zealand into the broader Western Alliance. In contrast, being seen as a Pacific Island state removes New Zealand from these concerns. In that case New Zealand would substantially cease to have the obligations that comes from being part of the wider western alliance.

Of course, things are not nearly as definitive as the above dichotomy postulates. New Zealand will continue to be part of the broader Western alliance for many years to come. The issue is more about the extent and relevance of New Zealand within the western alliance.

“It seems unlikely that the NZDF would now be able to replicate what was done in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and, in my view, it seems unlikely that Australia would now expect such an effort from New Zealand.”

Less expected

The government seems very aware of the delicate state of New Zealand’s position. New Zealand remains a strong contributor, relative to our size, to Western issues. Witness New Zealand’s contribution in training Ukrainian soldiers, to the antipiracy mission against the Houthis, and most recently, to the multinational naval mission enforcing the embargo against North Korea.

But there are also indications that less is expected of New Zealand than previously was the case.

For instance, in the late 1980s there was a great deal of public pressure from Australia that New Zealand join the ANZAC ship programme. It was anticipated that New Zealand would order four ships out of twelve. At the time of the programme, the ANZAC frigates were seen as the backbone of Australasian naval capability. In the event, New Zealand only purchased two with an option for two more ships.

I know from direct experience, the unhappiness of Australian officials when New Zealand did not follow through with the option for the two additional ships.

In contrast there is no apparent public pressure that New Zealand should sign on to the Australian Mogami ship programme. I have no doubt that Australia would welcome a New Zealand decision to join the programme, but if there is any serious political pressure to do so, it seems quite muted.

Less offered

Australian military capability has been deviating away from that of New Zealand’s for at least two decades. Throughout the twentieth century New Zealand maintained a certain level of military capability with Australia, typically in the order of one sixth or one seventh, when taking into account the full array of military capability of both nations. This is no longer the case.

Even on a generous measure, New Zealand would barely have one tenth of Australia’s overall capability. The deviation first occurred with the ANZAC ship programme when New Zealand only purchased two ships instead of the anticipated four.

The deployments to East Timor, Afghanistan and the Solomons did disguise the growing gap, with New Zealand going to tremendous lengths to deploy at least a quarter of the overall Australasian contribution. However, that scale of deployment proved to be unsustainable for the NZDF, given that the size disparity of the two militaries was considerably greater than the scale of the deployments indicated.

It seems unlikely that the NZDF would now be able to replicate what was done in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and, in my view, it seems unlikely that Australia would now expect such an effort from New Zealand.

Their expectations of the trans-Tasman alliance are not what they once were. It is not only a question of military capability, but also the level of commitment to the ANZAC alliance. This is particularly so when taking into account the range of political views across the New Zealand parliament. If Australia is New Zealand’s only ally, does New Zealand act in a way that fully accepts the obligation of being an ally?

Future questioned

This article poses the fundamental question as to whether New Zealand should simply accept the change in our circumstances: that New Zealand’s economic and political circumstances are such that New Zealand can now only play a lesser role than once was the case.

That rather being seen primarily as part of the Australasian nexus, New Zealand is taking more of a hybrid role. That New Zealand should be seen as being as not only as an Australasian nation but also be seen as a nation that has much in common with the Pacific Island nations, that is, smaller and less capable than once was the case. Less is expected and less is offered.

I am certain the current government would strenuously argue that is not the case. I suspect that the Labour party would also have a similar view. But would Labour’s potential partners in government share Labour’s view?

Will this issue play a part in the coming election? Probably not, at least directly. But I suspect this issue underlies the present malaise about the future of New Zealand.